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Abstract
This paper describes a critical analysis of three recently published theoretical frameworks
developed to explain management control design within inter-organisational collaborations.
The particular concern is that, despite a plethora of theoretical frameworks attempting to
explain management control design choices, these frameworks have yet to be utilised in
practice. The focus is on their respective ability to explain control change in response to
coordination problems, recognising the interactive nature of inter-organisational relationships.
It adopts an approach previously used in the accounting literature for the purpose of
promoting discussion and critical reflection. The resulting case study analysis provides
critical insight on how each of the frameworks can influence discipline-specific
understanding of control evolution. Improved understanding is expected to indicate potential
usefulness to accounting practice. Hence, within inherent limitations, the paper reflects on
opportunities to consolidate extant management accounting theory.
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Introduction
The need for empirical study of antecedents of management control change is acknowledged
in the accounting literature (Anderson & Dekker 2005). In spite of extensive literature, there
has been mixed progress in explaining control practice (ASCPA Australia 2005),
characterised as an "inconclusiveness [that] is even more severe if we consider that the
findings proposed by contributors are in some cases contradictory." (Caglio & Ditillo 2008,
p. 874).
Examination of this trend is important, timely and is motivated by recognition that
accounting research to date has consumed significant effort in establishing theoretical
frameworks that have received little or no recognition in practice. From a theoretical
perspective, a number of these frameworks are based on similar antecedent constructs (Caglio
& Ditillo 2008). Consequently, there is an opportunity to examine the degree to which
alternate frameworks provide understanding of management control evolution within
interorganisational relationships. Echoing Luft and Shields (2002, p. 24):
“.. if these different sets of variables describe the same phenomena from the
viewpoint of different theories that divide up and name the phenomena differently,
there is more reason for research in one stream to take account of analysis and
evidence produced by research in other streams”.
The paper has one key objective, namely, deeper understanding of the relative efficacy
of extant management control frameworks in describing the dynamics of management control
design change in practice. Given a reflective approach, the paper will not attempt to confirm
causal links between the management controls implemented in response to coordination
problems. The resulting critique attempts to transcend finding fault with extant management
control theory, offering insights by identifying, challenging and examining the manner in
which alternate management control theory translates into practice (Alvesson & Deetz 2000).
The next section of the paper provides a summary of the academic literature associated
with management coordination problems. The third section of the paper summarises the
research method, with results obtained presented in the fourth section. Critical analysis of the
findings, including avenues for future research opportunities, is discussed in the final section
of the paper.
Management Control Frameworks
A Summary of the Coordination Literature
Given increased complexity and the pluralist nature of inter-organisational relationships, an
increased interest in coordination is found in various literature, including supply chain
(Danese et al. 2004; Holweg & Pil 2008) and organisational science (Hong et al. 2009). Calls
within the organisational science literature draw attention to the importance of work design,
both within and between organizations (Barley & Kunda 2001). Recognising emerging
trends in work practices associated with information intensity, globalisation, technology and
inter-organisational collaboration, for example, Sinha and Van de Ven (2005) highlight a
need to refocus research on work design affected (and affecting) interactions between work
units. Hence, a focus on coordination.
Coordination in the organisational science literature is focused on resolving task
dependencies within a work setting (Crowston 1997; Malone & Crowston 1994). The
primary research interest has been, until recently (Hong et al. 2009), on identifying
substitutable coordination mechanisms and determining which mechanism applies to specific
circumstances (see Thompson 1967; Galbraith 1977; Mintzberg, 1979). This literature
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addresses the “structure” by which behaviours are programmed as well as the “process” by
which adjustments are made in light of new information (Argote, 1982). Accordingly, the
theoretical frameworks explored here include coordination as an antecedent for adoption of
management controls. In support of this approach, “focusing on control problems could
produce benefits both in the literature development and in the completeness of the description
and interpretation of reality” (Caglio & Ditillo 2008, p. 891).
Coordination Control Problems
Building on research by Dekker (2004, 2008), the paper adopts a multi-dimensional view of
the antecedents of coordination control problems. Often understood in terms of Contingency
Theory, coordination control problems are related to realisation of a lack of clear interorganisational relationship boundaries. The result is failure to achieve the relationship
outcomes agreed by the parties to a “level of mutual satisfaction” (Caglio & Ditillo 2008, p.
891). To that end, management control constructs used in this paper are based on prior
academic literature, recognising theoretical advances to date and improving the likelihood of
comparison between research streams.
Based on the extant literature, operationalisation of the antecedents for coordination
problems is focussed on three constructs, namely: task characteristics, task environment and
interdependence. In summary, task characteristics in an inter-organisational context are
concerned with task complexity (Dekker, 2004, 2008) and programmability (Spekle 2001).
Task environment is influenced by reputation (Tomkins 2001), relative bargaining power
(Donada & Nogatchewsky 2006) and the degree to which both parties to the transaction agree
that power and relevant information have been shared as a result of the transaction
(Kammonga & Meer-Kooistra 2007). Interdependence is largely driven by the degree to
which buyer and supplier services are related to one another, increasing the impact of
transaction complexity (Dekker 2008), contractual commitment (Poppo & Zenger 2002) and
values integration (Goles & Chin 2005).
Management Control Frameworks
Recent literature reviews on inter-organisational management control point to use of a diverse
range of theoretical perspectives (Vosselman & Meer-Kooistra 2006). Given the existence of
detailed attempts to describe and categorise this research (see Caglio & Ditillo 2008), details
are not repeated here. Based on an approach to “good theory” outlined by Levie and
Lichtenstein (2008, three management control frameworks are identified for comparison.
Whilst far from exhaustive, the frameworks selected here represent the development of
management control theory addressing predefined criteria.1
Two papers from the 2008 Accounting Organization & Society (AOS) special edition on
management control and one published in Management Accounting Research (MAR) in the
same year provide sources for the three management control frameworks used in the paper:
 Management Control Archetypes – a multi-theory perspective focussed on
emergence of control problems (Caglio & Ditillo 2008);
 Management Control Packages – focussed on the practice of combining of controls
into “packages” (Malmi & Brown, 2008);
 Trust-Building Management Control– based on a synthesis of the extant trustbuilding literature (Vosselman & Meer-Kooistra, 2008).

1

The key criteria are coverage of a range of control types across a range of perspectives from the accounting literature (e.g.
formal and informal; market and bureaucratic); alignment with relationship problems; published in leading accounting
journals in 2008/9 using current research; and the use of theory based approach based on multi-disciplinary constructs.

.
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Alternate accounting research on theory-building to explain inter-organisational controls
tends to focus on specific aspects such as alliance partner selection (for example, Dekker
2008), a single level of analysis such as strategic (Simons 1990) or one type of control such
as trust (Langfield-Smith 2008; Velez et al. 2008). With this in mind, management control
mechanisms associated with the selected frameworks are outlined next.
Management Control Mechanisms
In each of the control frameworks examined here, a range of formal and informal control
mechanisms are adopted in response to the emergence of control problems. Research
highlighted earlier provides a basis for examination of the adoption of key control
mechanisms found in a post-contractual relationship. As a result, management controls
comprises the following mechanisms:
Table 1: Summary of management control mechanisms
Control Mechanism
Behaviour Controls
Outcome Controls
Contract Controls

Social Controls

Market Controls

Description & Source
Controls directed at guiding behaviour, excluding changes to
contract terms associated with these items (Dekker 2004)
Quantitative measures, standards and feedback processes,
excluding changes to contract terms (Dekker 2004)
Clauses included in the design and modification to the terms of the
outsourcing contract developed and formally agreed by both
parties (Vosselman & Meer-Kooistra 2008)
“Management control practices targeting minds, through norms,
emotions, beliefs and values, are intended to affect behaviour
indirectly." (Alvesson & Karreman 2004, p. 425; also Dekker
2004)
Market alternatives to guide behaviour including credible threats
of substitution with alternate suppliers for part/all of in-scope
services

Critical Analysis Framework
As this paper takes a critical research perspective, its main focus is to seek greater
understanding and identify opportunities to develop the management accounting concepts
discussed here. The paper adopts an approach articulated by Alvesson and Deetz (2000, pp.
17-20), outlining three tasks of critical research: ‘insight’, ‘critique’ and ‘transformative
redefinitions’. Similar approaches are adopted in the accounting literature, particularly in
research on Intellectual Capital (Dumay 2009) and public sector accounting (Laughlin 1995).
Each of these tasks is discussed from a dynamic inter-organisational management control
perspective.
Insight
Alvesson and Deetz (2000, p. 17) identify the task of ‘insight’ as being to demonstrate “our
commitment to the hermeneutic, interpretive and ethnographic goals of local understandings
closely connected to and appreciative of the lives of real people in real situations”. From a
management control perspective, insight involves attempts to understand the impact of
control practices on both human actors and their organisations, helping to provide new
perspectives on questions of how management control works between firms and what
comprises control.
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Whilst not explicitly based on Middle-Range Theory and German critical thinking as
described by Laughlin (1995)2, the critical analysis approach adopted here shares the aim of
providing an opportunity for researchers to make known “what we are doing and why we are
doing it” (Laughlin 1995, p. 78). It allows outcomes of the critical analysis to be
communicated, being an open theoretical model supporting a range of methods and
recommendations for change that are based on practice and include the researcher as part of
the discovery process (Laughlin 1995). Thus, a performative approach, recognising “that
there is no fundamental formula to understanding the role of management control in
organization and society” (Mouritsen 2006, p. 823) is selected as the critical perspective used
here.
Critique
The objective of critique “is to counteract the dominance of taken-for-granted goals, ideas,
ideologies and discourses which put their imprints on management and organization
phenomena” (Alvesson & Deetz 2000, p. 18). It is argued that a critique of management
control frameworks is needed given that, whilst changing in recent years to reflect
sociological constructs in particular, one of the problems of contemporary accounting theory
is the adoption of ideas and terminology sourced from traditional management thinking. The
proliferation of contemporary management control frameworks attempting to describe the
phenomenon provides tangible evidence of this thinking (Caglio & Ditillo 2008).
Transformative redefinition
The final step of the critique “is the development of critical, managerially relevant knowledge
and practical understandings that enable change and provide skills for new ways of
operating” (Alvesson & Deetz 2000, p. 19). Key to management control dynamics, inherent
contradictions in espoused benefits of management control and the reality of organisational
practices are highlighted. These contradictions are intended as opportunities to develop
insights that influence future management practices (Alvesson & Deetz 2000).
Research And Sites
Case Studies
The unit of analysis for the purposes of this paper is both the outsourcing transaction and the
back-office operations domain within an outsourcing relationship. Buyer and supplier points
of view were explored. The proposed field study includes a collection of data from six
existing outsourcing arrangements within a single industry – home loan providers in the
Australian Consumer Mortgage sector. The six relationships exhibit varying levels of control
design, client and servicer size, service scope and fate. This allows exploration of a clearly
definable organisational boundary of the full interorganisational relationship. However, the
predominant outsourcing relationship explored (i.e. four of six case studies) is between a
medium-sized specialised residential real estate lender and a medium size primary (or lead)
service provider supporting customer operations and technology functions.
As the participant firms are in the same industry with different inter-organisational
boundaries, governance structures, controls and relationship success, a number of key
variables identified in the MCS literature were controlled in order to explore governance and
control variables practices (see Whang 1992; Deeds & Hill 1998; Seal 2004). The specific
2

Given the focus of the paper is practice rather than philosophy, further discussion is not included
here. It can be argued, however, that nature of the inquiry in the paper is abductive as described by
Pierce (1959) involving critical analysis framed by theoretical preconditions (see Crotty, 1998).
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control variables include industry/product competition, supplier power, asset specificity,
uncertainty (or incomplete contracting) and frequency (or repetitive transaction exchange).
An added advantage of the research scope is it is focused on an industry that has a long
history of utilising outsourced service providers, utilising a range of formal (action and
outcome based) and informal management controls.
The Outsourcing Agreement and associated operational and financial data was sourced on a
non-attributable confidential basis. The outsourcing buyers were chosen as representative of
the entities operating in the mortgage industry in Australia that have developed and
implemented management control associated specifically with Outsourcing Agreements they
have been party to. All are unlisted non-government enterprises. Some are subsidiaries of
publically listed companies. Table 2 summarises sources of governance documentation
analysed.

Document Type

Alpha

Beta

Gamma

Delta

Epsilon

Zeta

TOTAL

Table 2: Case study dimensions – summary of governance document scope

Minutes of Meetings

25

7

4

19

8

10

73

Reports

1

-

4

1

4

5

15

Emails

11

-

-

-

-

-

11

Other

-

-

-

-

-

9

9

Total

37

7

8

20

12

24

108

Method
The initial phase of research involves coding analysis (see Krippendoff 1980). Data includes
contract and related contractual control material, governance material such as governance
meeting minutes and agreed reporting artifacts gathered along with operational performance
reporting achieved by respective outsourcing service providers. The initial analysis is
followed by semi-structured interviews. As a result, the paper will examine key stakeholder
perceptions of management control design for the overall interorganisational relationship.
The methodological approach is conducted in line with the work of Birnberg et al. (1990)
where multiple research methods are used to gather and triangulate empirical data. The above
methods yields results which helps explore the extent to which each control framework fits
observed data.
Results
A key buying criteria in all six outsource relationships was the avoidance of investment in
technology and human resources as well as reduction in operating costs. In the three cases
that involved start-up buyers, the absence of capability to create and sustain these functions
inhouse at the time of the transaction was also a key factor. The importance of relationship
management and communication was identified early. As expressed by a buyer operations
team leader:
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“Communication has not been all that effective. Need to meet on a more regular
basis, aside from emails, particularly now that there are 2 new teams actioning the
settlements and servicing functions”
Recognition of inter-organisational communication gaps is an important driver for adoption
of joint analysis activities to address coordination problems emerging in all six relationships.
Joint problem analysis was, in turn, a significant aspect in the evolution of management
control, used to help drive greater process coordination. For example, in one case, there was
informal recognition that outsourcing strategy was evolving to focus on improved customer
service with willingness to trade-off improvements in customer service for increased service
cost. Strategy evolution was responding to emerging customer requirements identified
through marketing focus groups and regular customer surveys conducted by the buyer entity
over time. The relationship saw increased use of social controls at an operational
management level as an effective way of addressing coordination problems as well as
supporting greater alignment with evolving customer-focussed outsourcing strategy:
“We made it a point of treating the employee of <Delta Supplier> as if they were
our employees. There’s a fine line but we thought it was very important that we
didn’t have a them and us relationship.”
As a result, there is evidence of increased levels of work coordination, initially at a
relationship management level.
“a strong understanding by <Supplier> of what our strategy was…and the way in
which we wanted to have the interaction with our customers”
With this relationship background in mind, the following results provide an overview of the
findings using each of the three management control frameworks.
Management Control Archetypes
Coding analysis for the Caglio and Ditillo (2008) framework sourced from governance
artefacts sourced from the six case studies is summarised in Table 3.

Keyword Subcategories

Alpha

Beta

Gamma

Delta

Epsilon

Zeta

TOTAL

Table 3: Management control type results (percentage total actions by category)

Behaviour Controls

63

76

100

46

36

59

57

Contract Controls

16

16

-

6

20

4

12

Market Controls

1

-

-

-

-

-

0

Organisational Norms

10

-

-

38

36

27

20

Outcome Controls

9

8

-

10

8

8

10

Trust

1

-

-

-

-

2

1

Total

51

5

0

19

6

19

100

As Table 3 indicates, behaviour controls are the predominant management control type
over the life of the six relationships, as summarised below.
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First, all of the outsourcing relationships studied had a clear preference for
implementing new behaviour controls after the contract has been signed. Two cases in
particular, with additional contract controls as well as behaviour controls, were actively
managing the relationship through the ongoing development of formal control mechanisms.
The Gamma case was the extreme example of this pattern, adding these controls exclusively
ex ante the relevant outsourcing contracts. However, the Epsilon case was a relatively lower
user of these controls with use of a combination of contract and organisational norms with
behaviour controls. This may have reflected preferences of individual actors with caution
being suggested in adding such controls, as highlighted by the (buyer) Operations Manager:
“The tendency of the outsourcing client (is to specify the how-to) because they want
to outsource but they (also) want control. It’s a natural thing but it’s a trap.”
Second, three of the six cases made some use of the Contract Control type. The other
outsourcing relationships added little or no controls of this type. The role of the contract as a
frame for the relationship is partly evidenced by a (buyer) Relationship Manager:
“We took a lot of time in developing it (and) in engagement, making sure it was
right.”
Third, based on usage, the Organizational Norm Control types are of relatively high
importance for three of the relationships. For the Epsilon case, it equalled behaviour controls,
as expressed by the buyer Relationship Manager:
“… there was a fairly good mutual understanding of what was expected.”, and
“a strong understanding by (the outsourcer) of what our strategy was…and the
way in which we wanted to have the interaction with our customers”
Based on available data, confirmed by interview transcripts, there appears to be a low
propensity to change other management controls defined within this particular theoretical
framework.
Management Control Packages
The second coding framework describes management control packages described by Malmi
& Brown (2008) producing document coding summarised in Table 4.

Keyword Subcategories

Alpha

Beta

Gamma

Delta

Epsilon

Zeta

TOTAL

Table 4: Management control package results (percent by subcategory)

Administrative Controls

30

49

31

28

31

76

39

Cultural Controls

2

29

16

30

16

-

16

Cybernetic Controls

6

2

3

11

3

12

9

Planning

62

16

50

31

50

12

35

Reward & Compensation

-

4

-

-

-

-

1

Total

20

14

7

18

27

14

100
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Examining a keyword frequency for the control package subcategories, 39% of
sentences with a control package theme (a total of 377 sentences) contained references to
administrative controls. Based on keyword sentence counts, the minimum usage was
exhibited by Gamma comprising 30 sentences with the maximum being Epsilon comprising
99 sentences. Planning controls are the next in frequency of use over substantive period of the
relationships. Accordingly, trends indicated in Table 4 result in the following key findings:
Administrative Controls are the predominant management control element utilised by all
of the six outsourcing relationships studied, along with planning controls. In particular, the
Zeta case was a proportionally prolific user of procedural changes in combination with
increased cybernetic and planning controls. This is despite an already high use of such
controls in the original contract compared to other relationships studied. Beta was also
focused on this form of control being a relatively high user of these controls. For example, a
key source of coordination problems is associated with increasing complexity of the Buyer’s
product offering along with increasing business volume, evidenced in a year two governance
meeting document:
“Further clarity to be provided over final progress payments and LMI funding ..”,
and “Processing requirements to be streamlined…”
The other relationships also made significant changes to these controls, tending to use
them in combination with action planning, in order to address coordination problems.
Changes to procedures followed by governance structures are the predominant form of postcontractual response to coordination problems for all relationships except Gamma, where
organisational changes were preferred.
On the other hand, Cultural Controls were not generally seen as important with the
exception of Beta and Delta, which made extensive use of such controls, complemented with
simultaneous use of administrative controls. Where changes to these controls are
implemented, imposition of client values and, to a lesser extent, clan controls were clearly
favoured.
Cybernetic Controls represent approximately 10% of the overall changes controls.
When changes are implemented, they tend to be based on non-financial measures with some
limited use of hybrid metrics. No additional financial measures were implemented by any
relationship. As discussed in a later section of the paper, this finding is significant.
Planning Controls are the second most significant component of change in overall
management control design post-contract, with Alpha, Delta and Epsilon being the major
users. Action planning is overwhelmingly in the form of change implemented for this control
type with only two instances (one each for Alpha and Delta) associated with long term
planning controls. These findings appear contrary to expectations in the control literature,
given the relative size of the clients associated with these relationships.
Rewards & Compensation were not a material component of the overall management
control package, with Beta and Epsilon being the only relationships to add this control
measure to address coordination problems.
Trust Building Management Control
The final coding framework utilised management control archetypes described by Vosselman
and Meer-Kooistra (2008), as summarised in Table 5 below.
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Keyword Subcategories

Alpha

Beta

Gamma

Delta

Epsilon

Zeta

TOTAL

Table 5: Trust building results (percent by subcategory)

Accounting for Control

19

36

12

45

47

74

39

Accounting for Trust

81

64

88

55

53

26

61

Accounting for Stability

-

-

-

-

-

-

0

Total

27

7

7

16

27

16

226

TT

Accounting for Control is a key management control element utilised by all of the six
outsourcing relationships studied. In particular, Epsilon and Zeta were significant users of
changes to governance structure in combination with a comparatively moderate increase in
performance measures, in spite of the already high use of such controls in the original
contract in both cases compared to other relationships studied (except Gamma). The opinions
of the Epsilon (supplier) Relationship Manager suggests that this may have been associated
with problems in the early years of the relationship:
“There was a high gap in expectations and…(the outsourcer) bit off something that
it could not deliver and, naturally, that had a very detrimental impact on the
relationship.”
Beta was also focused on this form of control. The other relationships also made some
changes to these controls, tending to use them in combination with action planning, in order
to address coordination problems. Changes to procedures followed by governance structures
are the predominant form of response to coordination problems except for Gamma.
Accounting for Trust Building is the predominant management control element utilised
by all of the six outsourcing relationships studied, but in particular by Alpha, Delta and
Epsilon. The dominant control is the normative frame. Whilst not strictly a control in the
normal sense of that construct, this predominant frame indicates a willingness to build trust.
Accounting for Stability was not utilised based on the evidence available. These results
and associated findings are discussed in more detail next.
Critical Analysis, Discussion And Conclusions
Insight
Reviewing the results of coding analysis, there are a number of key findings of interest
starting with control construct similarities highlighted by Table 6 below, summarising the
relative percentage (of total coded references) for each control:
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Trust Building
Framework

Percent

39

-

-

Cultural

16

Trust

61

12

Planning

35

Control

39

Outcome

10

Cybernetic

9

Market

0

Rewards

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

Stability

0

Percent

Percent

Table 6 Comparison of nominally equivalent controls (percent by control type)
MC
Package
Framework

57

Administrative

Organisation
Norms
& Trust
Contract

21

MCS Type
Framework
Behavioural

For example, in the first row, behaviour control (MCS Type) and administrative control
(MCS Package) are equivalent with similar coordination problem antecedents. The Trust
building framework is not concerned with these controls. The following paragraphs address
insights germane to control contracts across the three frameworks analysed.
Although largely equivalent in terms of construct and indicator definition, there is a
material under-representation of Administrative Control constructs when the Management
Control Package framework is compared with the equivalent under the Management Control
Type framework (Behaviour Controls). In most of the relationships, use of a different coding
framework will result in differences in the level of identification of post-contractual changes
in formal controls. For example, using the Control Package framework, the Alpha (where 42
sentences or 46% of all changes are new Behaviour controls) and Delta (160 or 63%)
relationships indicate a material over-representation of formal control constructs when
compared with the equivalent under the Control Type framework (Administrative controls
occur in 23 sentences or 30% of all control change references for Alpha and 19 sentences or
28% for Delta respectively).
Whilst generally equivalent in concept, the Control Package framework of Malmi &
Brown (2008) materially under-represents the importance of informal controls
(Organisational Norm and Trust MCS types or Cultural Controls in the MCS Package
framework). The effect is partly evidenced by both the number and relative proportion of
sentences exhibiting the alternate management control constructs. This pattern is consistent
across all relationships although most obvious when comparing the Beta and Zeta
relationship where the coding results would suggest opposite conclusions.3 The insight is also
consistent with the focus on social controls in the interviews with Beta and Zeta
representatives, selected examples being evidenced in the results section earlier.
Whilst Outcome Controls (MCS Type) and Cybernetic Controls (MCS Package) are
considered to be broadly equivalent concepts, the definitions of indicators used for
Management Control Package (Malmi & Brown 2008) appear to result in an
overrepresentation of these control types. Given the low absolute number of sentences

3

The respective results being 0 vs 15 sentences (0% vs 29%) for Beta and 27 vs 0 sentences (29% vs 0%) for Zeta.
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identified for Beta, the finding may not be material for this relationship. The insight with
respect to Beta is also consistent with the interviews citing lack of interest in output controls.
There is a clear difference between the Trust Building framework and the other two
frameworks. In particular, trust-building activities in this framework, incorporating social
controls and broader related social constructs of the other frameworks, appear to result in
greater identification of informal controls. This may be the result of the adoption of
constructs from cognitive psychology. It may also be the result of the data gathering
techniques used for this study that are less useful to the identification and understanding of
the constructs relevant to this framework. On the other hand, the combination of governance
and output controls in the formal control may result in a view that there is a path dependency
in inter-organisational relationships from formal to trust-based control, a progression that
may not reflect the changing nature of the relationship (including regression to increased
incidence coordination problems for isolated periods). These aspects are discussed later in
this section.
As the above insights illustrate, a review of management control theory and practice has
found definitional gaps between the espoused theory and the practice of management control
within the three frameworks studied. A central issue is that while there are a plethora of
theoretical frameworks developed for the measurement, management and reporting of
control, these frameworks are not clearly operationalised in order to be consciously adopted
by firms, despite the potential benefits. The intent of this paper has been to resist the
development of new theoretical views, instead examining management control practice to
develop understanding such that a discourse can be developed that increases the
understanding of the dynamics of management control in practice. Doing so develops a
critique of management control theory that has the potential to influence future practice. This
critique is outlined below.
Critique
In light of the insights described above, critical analysis of the three frameworks identifies the
following material inconsistencies at a construct level:
Whilst the theoretical source of social control constructs is comparable, wider
interpretation of Organisational Norms, Trust and Clan Controls contained in the
Organisational Norm construct (MCS Type) allows a consistent identification of informal
styles of management control. This is reflected in the slightly higher incidence of such
constructs. Conversely, trust-building constructs of the third control framework also appear to
be a significant aspect of management control. Given trust building activities are intended to
lead to the adoption of trust controls, they may be more readily described as an antecedent or
mediating factor to trust-based controls rather than separately identified controls. The
interview transcripts appear to support this interpretation, particularly for the Delta case study.
Processes associated with problem escalation, review and reporting appear repeatedly
during the post-contractual management of the relationship. Related constructs such as
Governance, Contract Control and Action Planning are not directly reflected in the MCS type
framework except to the extent to which action planning is adopted as an initial step in
address emerging coordination problems, leading to new or modified controls. Consistent
with the Trust-Building framework, such activities are intended to lead to adoption of new
control mechanisms and may be more readily described as antecedents to coordination
problems. The Planning Control construct is unique to the MCS Package framework,
allowing identification of activities specifically aimed at addressing coordination problems
and/or implementing performance improvements in the relationship. As it is not separately
identified in the other framework, combination of the separate construct as an antecedent or
mediating factor in control evolution may be warranted rather than as a separate control.
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Finally, the more detailed categories associated with the Cybernetic Control construct
used in the Management Control Package framework appear to provide a more definitive
coverage of the range of performance management tools used in practice than the generic
term of outcome control used in the MCS Type framework. Such detail is likely to provide
greater diagnostic capability as evidenced by the coding analysis conducted for the purposes
of the paper.
Transformative Redefinition
With critique of the three control frameworks studied, the following paragraphs identify
opportunities for consolidation of extant control frameworks.
An opportunity exists to consolidate trust constructs with trust-building antecedents and
planning/action planning as antecedents or moderating influences on the evolution of
management controls. As this paper did not study normative relationships between
coordination problems and control mechanisms, confirmation of linkages between
antecedents, problems and management control responses is not discussed here. Following
Luft and Shields (2002, p. 32), “theory-defined variables are more likely to have well-defined,
stable, unitary meanings, making it possible to identify consistent cause-and-effect relations.”
This is a suggested topic of follow-up research to this paper.
Whilst detailed theory building is beyond the scope of this paper, the insights and
critique outlined above may be assimilated into a framework that reflects consistency in
theoretical constructs between the three frameworks studied. Specifically, other theoretical
framework described in the accounting literature focused on specific aspects of control such
as inter-organisational partner selection (Dekker 2008) and initial post-contract control
selection (Langfield-Smith 2008) can be analysed for potential to incorporate associated,
largely contingent, constructs into a comprehensive control framework.
This approach, involving critical analysis of competing framework attempts to
summarise the progress in the accounting literature associated with the development of multitheory, multidisciplinary typology of management control.
In closing, the limitations of the paper need to be acknowledged. First, whilst the six
case studies represent approximately 25% of the consumer mortgage industry in Australia,
the limited number selected places limits on the generalisability of the insights requiring
further industry and geographical diversity (see Bigelow & Argyres 2008. Secondly, a
number of the theoretical constructs require refinement to account for contextual and
industry-specific antecedents as well as potential mediating factors in the evolution of control
mechanisms. Examples include output measurability, information asymmetry and trust
building. Thirdly, the financial performance implications of utilising different control
mechanisms were not examined. Fourthly, exploration of an entire network of interorganisational relationships, not identified as a significant influence in this study4, may also
be a potentially fruitful line of inquiry. This expanded empirical research may address
concerns of the type expressed by Fritsch et al (2007, p. 23) that “no clear conclusions on the
impact of outsourcing or vertical integration on firm performance can be drawn…”. Finally,
whilst partly mitigated by coding analysis and semi-structured interviews, there are
limitations associated with reliance on memory and recollection by interview participants.
These limitations remain opportunities for further research.

4

Although the source of some performance problems that needed to be addressed in the context of the primary relationship.
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